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YOUNG v. AMERICAN MINI THEATRES, INC.:
CREATING LEVELS OF PROTECTED SPEECH
By Cynthia D. Stevenin*
Until recent years, urban life was comparatively simple; but with
the great increase and concentration of population, problems have de-
veloped, and constantly are developing, which require additional
restrictions in respect of the use and occupation of private lands in urban
communities . . . for while the meaning of constitutional guaranties
never varies, the scope of their application must expand or contract to
meet the new and different conditions which are constantly coming
within the field of their operation. In a changing world, it is impossible
that it should be otherwise.'
Introduction
The scope of the First Amendment right of expression has expanded
and contracted as the values and needs of American communities have
changed.2 Speech and published statements have always been entitled to the
full protection of the First Amendment.' Films have also been found to come
under the protection of the First Amendment because they are a means of
expression.4 The Court has held that speech may not be regulated on the
* Member, second year class.
1. City of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 386-87 (1926).
2. The fate of one type of expression, sex-oriented material, has been varied and
confused. In Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957), the Court held that
obscenity was not protected by the First Amendment. The opinion expressly excepted
from this holding materials portraying sex with artistic, literary, or scientific merit. Depic-
tion of sex in such circumstances is acceptable to allow persons "to cope with the exigen-
cies of their period." Id. at 488 (citing Thomhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 101-02
(1940)). In Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), the Court adopted a standard that,
in effect, left the determination of obscenity to local communities. "The basic guidelines
for the trier of fact must be: (a) whether 'the average person, applying contemporary
community standards' would find that the work, taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient
interest; . . . (b) whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way, sex-
ual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state law; and (c) whether the work,
taken as a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value." Id. at 24.
In Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 57-58 (1973), the Court held that the
states have a legitimate interest in the regulation of the sale and distribution of obscene
materials available to the public, including adult theaters barring minors. All these cases,
however, granted non-obscene sexual expression the full protection of the First Amend-
ment.
3. See text accompanying notes 142-59 infra.
4. Times Film Corp. v. Chicago, 365 U.S. 43 (1961); Joseph Burstyn, Inc. v. Wil-
son, 343 U.S. 495 (1952).
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basis of content although all speech, including films, may be subject to
reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions. 5 Adult theaters have a
marked effect on the surrounding area; thus the time, place, and manner of
their exhibition has been closely controlled. Regulation of adult materials
has been permitted to further a municipality's interest in the morality of its
citizens6 and the quality of its neighborhoods.' Cities have been able to
regulate the location of adult theaters using zoning ordinances, which tradi-
tionally have been granted great deference by the Supreme Court, even
when constitutional rights were involved.8 This power has been extended in
Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc. ,' wherein the Court held that adult
films, even though not obscene according to the standards set by the Su-
preme Court,1" may be more strictly regulated than other forms of protected
First Amendment expression.
In American Mini Theatres, the Court rejected vagueness, prior re-
straint, and equal protection challenges to Detroit, Michigan zoning ordi-
nances that regulated the location of adult theaters in order to minimize their
effect on the surrounding neighborhoods. Although a conflict existed be-
tween the Detroit ordinances and First Amendment freedoms because the
location of adult theaters was regulated while that of non-adult theaters was
not, the Court substantially ignored the zoning issue, and decided the case
primarily on First Amendment grounds. Such an approach sets a precedent
that permits all municipalities to regulate adult entertainment in ways more
intrusive than previously allowed through zoning ordinances that burden
sex-oriented expression. 1 In holding that protected adult materials may be
5. Cf. Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (ordinance prohibiting all
but labor picketing within 150 feet of a school held violative of equal protection on
grounds that labor picketing is no less disruptive than other kinds). "But, above all else,
the First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict expression because
of its message, its ideas, its subject matter or its content." Id.
6. Times Film Corp. v. Chicago, 365 U.S. 43 (1961).
7. "In particular, we hold that there are legitimate state interests at stake in stem-
ming the tide of commercialized obscenity, even assuming it is feasible to enforce effec-
tive safeguards against exposure to juveniles and to passersby. Rights and interests 'other
than those of the advocates are involved'.... These include the interest of the public in
the quality of life and the total community environment, the tone of commerce in the
great city centers, and, possibly, the public safety itself." Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton,
413 U.S. 49, 57-58 (1973).
8. See City of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926). The Court re-
jected the Fifth Amendment as a ground for the invalidation of a zoning ordinance be-
cause of the deprivation of property without due process. See also Note, Zoning Ordi-
nance Which Classifies and Regulates Adult Movie Theatres And Bookstores Solely on the
Basis of the Content of the Materials Which They Purvey Held Violative of Equal Protec-
tion Clause, 44 FORDHAM L. REV. 657, 659 (1975); Note, Equal Protection and
Exclusionary Zoning: Boraas v. Village of Belle Terre, 60 VA. L. REv. 137, 176 (1974).
9. 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
10. See note 2 supra.
11. See, e.g., San Francisco Chronicle, Aug. 20, 1976, at 3. col. 4, indicating that
San Jose, California intends to adopt an ordinance similar to that of Detroit, including a
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regulated more strictly than protected non-adult materials, the Court allows
unequal treatment of protected speech. American Mini Theatres could imply
that all speech protected by the First Amendment may be assigned different
values relative to the value of political speech.
This note first discusses the ordinances passed by the city of Detroit and
delineates their apparent scope. The iss ues raised by the parties and the
holdings of the lower courts are summarized. A detailed discussion of the
Supreme Court opinion follows, dealing with the three primary constitu-
tional issues raised: vagueness, prior restraint, and equal protection. Each of
these sections begins with a statement of the claims presented and the
Court's holding, followed by a summary of the applicable constitutional
doctrines and an analysis of the Court's holding. Finally, the note discusses
possible zoning problems raised by this case.
I. Background
A. The Ordinances
Supporters of a 1962 Detroit zoning ordinance contended that concent-
ration of certain types of businesses lowered the quality of the neighbor-
hoods in which the businesses were located. To prevent this, the ordinance
provided that no two "harmful" businesses could be situated within 1,000
feet of one another. 12 In an attempt further to control concentrations of such
uses, the city in 1972 enacted two amendments to the ordinance.' 3 The first
amendment defined the terms "Adult Motion Picture Theatre"' 4 and
"Adult Mini Motion Picture Theatre,"'" adding them to the list of uses
already regulated, and described sexual areas and activities which, if exhi-
provision that no sex-oriented business may be located within 1,000 feet of any
residentially-owned property. Due to San Jose's overwhelmingly residential character, the
effect of such an ordinance would be to prevent the opening of any new sex-oriented
businesses. See also N.Y. Times, Nov. 28, 1976, at 1, col. I.
12. DETROIT, MICH., OFFICIAL ZONING ORDINANCE § 66.0000, as amended in
1972. Other included uses were adult bookstores, establishments where liquor is sold on
the premises, hotels and motels, pawnshops, pool or billiard halls, public lodging houses,
second-hand stores, shoeshine parlours, and taxi dance halls.
13. Id. DETROIT, MICH., OFFICIAL ZONING ORDINANCE, No. 742-G (1972)
(amending No. 390-G), and DETROIT, MICH., MUNICIPAL CODE, No. 743-G (1972)
(amending Ch. 5, art. 2).
14. An Adult Motion Picture Theatre is an "enclosed building with a capacity of
50 or more persons used for presenting material distinguished or characterized by an em-
phasis on matter depicting, describing or relating to, 'Specified Sexual Activities,' or
'Specified Anatomical Areas' for observation by patrons therein." DETROIT, MICH.,
OFFICIAL ZONING ORDINANCE, No. 742-G, § 32.0007 (1972) (amending No. 390-G).
See note 16 infra for a definition of "Specified Sexual Activities" and "Specified
Anatomical Areas."
15. An Adult Mini Motion Picture Theatre is described similarly to an Adult Mo-
tion Picture Theatre, see note 14 supra, but seats less than 50 persons. DETROIT, MICH.,
OFFICIAL ZONING ORDINANCE, No. 742-G, § 32.0007 (1972) (amending No. 390-G).
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bited in a film, would cause a theater to be labeled "adult.' '16 An "adult"
theater was one that was used to exhibit films that were "distinguished or
characterized by an emphasis" on sex-oriented material. 7 The amendment,
however, permitted a waiver of the 1,000 foot provision if the proposed use
did not encourage deterioration of the neighborhood, if the use was not
"contrary to the public interest or injurious to nearby properties, '"18 and if
the use observed the spirit and intent of the ordinance. 9 The second
amendment made it unlawful for anyone to operate any "Adult Motion
Picture Theatre," "Adult Mini Motion Picture Theatre," or "Drive-in
Theatre" unless he had received a license as required by the official zoning
ordinance and the City Code of Detroit."°
16. "Specified Sexual Activities" are defined as: "(1) Human Genitals in a state of
sexual stimulation or arousal, (2) Acts of human masturbation, sexual intercourse or
sodomy, (3) Fondling or other erotic touching of human genitals, pubic region, buttock or
female breast." DETROIT, MICH., OFFICIAL ZONING ORDINANCE, No. 742-G,
§ 66.0101 (1972) (amending No. 390-G). "Specified Anatomical Areas" were defined as:
"(1) Less than completely and opaquely covered: (a) human genitals or pubic region, (b)
buttocks and (c) female breast below a point immediately above the top of the areoia; and
(2) Human male genitals in a discernibly turgid state, even if completely and opaquely
covered." DETROIT, MICH., OFFICIAL ZONING ORDINANCE, No. 742-G, § 32.0007
(1972) (amending No. 390-G).
17. DETROIT, MICH., OFFICIAL ZONING ORDINANCE, No. 742-G (1972)
(amending No. 390-G), and DETROIT, MICH., MUNICIPAL CODE, No. 743-G (1972)
(amending Ch. 5, art. 2). The amendment also made it unlawful to establish any Adult
Bookstore, Adult Motion Picture Theatre, or Specified Class "D" Cabaret within 500 feet
of any building containing a residential dwelling or rooming unit. (A Class "D" Cabaret
features topless dancers, strippers, male or female impersonators. or similar entertainers.
No. 742-G, § 32,0023 (1972) (amending No. 390-G)). The prohibition could be waived
if the businessman filed with the city plan commission a petition approving the proposed
use signed by 51% of the persons owning, residing, or doing business within a 500-foot
radius of the proposed use. The petitioner was to attempt to contact all eligible locations,
and to maintain a list of all addresses at which contact was made. DETROIT, MICH.,
OFFICIAL ZONING ORDINANCE, No. 742-G, § 66.0103 (1972) (amending No. 390-G.)
A United States district court, in Nortown Theatres, Inc. v. Gribbs, 373 F. Supp. 363
(E.D. Mich. 1974), invalidated the 500-foot radius provision. Thus, this issue was not
before the Supreme Court in American Mini Theatres.
18. DETROIT, MICH., OFFICIAL ZONING ORDINANCE, § 66.0101 (a) (1972).
19. Waiver was permitted if the City Plan Commission made the following find-
ings:
"a) That the proposed use will not be contrary to the public interest or injurious to
nearby properties, and that the spirit and intent of this Ordinance will be observed.
b) That the proposed use will not enlarge or encourage the development of a 'skid
row' area.
c) That the establishment of an additional regulated use in the area will not be con-
trary to any program of neighborhood conservation nor will it interfere with any program
of urban renewal.
d) That all applicable regulations of this Ordinance will be observed." DETROIT,
MICH., OFFICIAL ZONING ORDINANCE, § 66.0101 (1972).
20. The municipal code provided: "The Mayor may refuse to issue a license for the
operation of any business regulated by this article, and may revoke any license already
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The effect of the city's ordinances is to require every adult theater
operator to obtain a waiver prior to establishing a theater within 1,000.feet of
another regulated use. Similarly, an adult theater, as a regulated use, cannot
operate within 1,000 feet of another regulated use unless the owner first
obtains a waiver. Even theater owners who only show a single film that is
"characterized by an emphasis" on sexual matters theoretically become
adult theater operators and therefore are subject to the ordinances.21 Failure
to comply with the ordinances subjects the owner to criminal penalties.2
B. Judicial History
American Mini Theatres and Pussy Cat Theatres of Michigan were
denied licenses as adult theaters because of their failure to comply with the
1,000 foot separation requirement.23 They were, however, licensed as ordi-
nary non-adult theaters. The theater owners brought suit in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, and asserted that the
Detroit ordinances violated their constitutional rights under the First and
Fourteenth Amendments to the Federal Constitution because (1) the lan-
guage of the ordinances is so vague as to deny them due process of law, (2)
the ordinances are prior restraints and invade the area of protection provided
by the First Amendment, and (3) the ordinances deprive the plaintiffs of the
equal protection of the law afforded to other theater operators .24
The district court held that the ordinances were framed with sufficient
specificity,25 and that the city clearly had the power to license and zone the
issued upon proof submitted to him of the violation by an applicant, or licensee, his agent
or employee, within the preceding two years of any criminal statute of the State, or of
any ordinance of this city regulating, controlling or in any way relating to the construc-
tion, use or operation of any of the establishments included in this article which evidences
a flagrant disregard for the safety or welfare of either the patrons, employees or persons
residing or doing business nearby." DETROIT, MICH., MUNICIPAL CODE, No. 743-G,
§ 5-2-3 (1972) (amending Ch. 5, art. 2).
21. Justice Blackmun, in his dissent in American Mini Theatres noted this by stat-
ing: "Neither does it instruct him on how to tell whether, assuming the films in question
are thus 'distinguished or characterized,' his theater is being 'used for presenting' such
films. That phrase could mean ever used, often used, or predominantly used, to name a
few possibilities." 427 U.S. at 89.
22. A violation of the zoning ordinance subjects the person to a fine of not more
than $500.00, or imprisonment for no more than 90 days. Each day a violation continues
constitutes a separate offense. DETROIT, MICH., OFFICIAL ZONING ORDINANCE, No.
742-G, § 69.0000 (1972) (amending No. 390-G.) Michigan statutes also allow a court to
declare a building a nuisance per se and authorize officials to abate the nuisance if it is
found that the use to which the building is put is in violation of a municipal zoning ordi-
nance. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 125.587 (1948).
23. 427 U.S. at 55.
24. Id. at 58.
25. Nortown Theatres, Inc. v. Gribbs, 373 F. Supp. 363, 367-68 (E.D. Mich.
1974).
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location of businesses.2 6 Further, the court found that the distinction be-
tween idult theaters and non-adult theaters on the basis of the content of the
films exhibited did serve to restrain conduct protected by the First Amend-
ment.27 Because the city had demonstrated a compelling interest in the
preservation of neighborhoods, however, and because the burden on expres-
sion was only indirectly related to the purpose of the ordinances, the court
held there was only a slight infringement of the First Amendment.2"
A three-judge court, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit, reversed, relying primarily on the proposition that government regu-
lation of expression must be content-neutral.29 The ordinances violated the
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because although
Detroit had demonstrated a compelling interest3" in preserving neighborhood
values,31 the court found the amendments to be an impermissible means of
achieving this objective. 32 Other less burdensome alternatives were availa-
ble. 33 The court held that the ordinances also violated the plaintiffs' First
26. Id. at 366.
27. Id. at 369, 370.
28. Id. at 369-71.
29. American Mini Theatres, Inc. v. Gribbs, 518 F.2d 1014, 1020 (6th Cir. 1975).
The court cited Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92 (1972) as support for this conclu-
sion. The Court held in Mosley that an ordinance prohibiting all picketing within 150 feet
of a school, except labor picketing, violated the equal protection clause because there was
no reason to suppose labor picketing was less disruptive than other types of picketing.
30. The court cited United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), which stated:
"[W]hen 'speech' and 'nonspeech' elements are combined in the same course of conduct,
a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can jus-
tify incidental limitations on First Amendment freedoms. To characterize the quality of
the governmental interest which must appear, the Court has employed a variety of descrip-
tive terms: compelling; substantial; subordinating; paramount; cogent; strong. Whatever
imprecision inheres in these terms, we think it clear that a governmental regulation is suf-
ficiently justified if it is within the constitutional power of the Government; if it furthers
an important or substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated
to the suppression of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First
Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest."
Id. at 376-77.
The Court has often distinguished between "pure" speech and speech that involves
conduct, or a non-communicative element. An example of pure speech would be a politi-
cal speech that did not incite to violence; an example of conduct that involves expression
is picketing. Exhibition of films involves both speech and conduct. Pure speech has been
afforded greater protection on the ground that talk is generally less harmful than conduct.
Of course, all speech involves some form of conduct, or a non-communicative element.
Therefore, all speech should be equally subject to regulation provided there is a showing
of a compelling governmental interest, regardless of the degree of non-communicative
elements present, on the basis of the effects of the expression.
31. American Mini Theatres, Inc. v. Gribbs, 518 F.2d 1014, 1018 (6th Cir. 1975).
32. Id. at 1019-20.
33. "The City could legally regulate movie theatres and bookstores under its police
powers by providing that such establishments be operated only in particular areas. It
[Vol. 4
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Amendment rights by imposing a prior restraint on expression.34 One of the
three judges dissented, arguing that the ordinances did not regulate the
content of expression, but rather regulated the right to locate a business
based on the potential adverse effects of its location.35 The dissent thereby
implied that the burden on First Amendment rights was no greater than
necessary to further the compelling governmental interest.
36
H. Supreme Court Opinion
The Supreme Court upheld the Detroit ordinances. Justice Stevens,
writing for the majority, rejected each of the constitutional claims presented
by the theater owners: vagueness, prior restraint in violation of the First
Amendment, and violation of the equal protection clause." Justice Powell
concurred in only two parts of the opinion. He would have decided the equal
protection claim by recognizing the ordinances as valid time, place, and
manner restrictions justified by the strong governmental interest in the qual-
ity of neighborhoods.3" Justice Stewart dissented, stating that the ordinances
impermissibly regulated the exhibition of films on the basis of content.39
Also dissenting, Justice Blackmun maintained that the ordinances were
vague and overbroad, and should therefore have been invalidated.4 °
A. Vagueness and Overbreadth
1. The Supreme Court's Disposition
The theater owners claimed that the ordinances were vague in two
respects. First, theater owners could not determine how much of the de-
scribed sexual activity would be permissible in a film before the exhibition
would be "characterized by an emphasis" on such matter. Second, the
ordinances failed to specify adequate procedures for obtaining a waiver of
the 1,000 foot provision. In the absence of such guidelines, it was argued
that decisions as to the granting of waivers would be ad hoc and subjective.4'
might also have validly provided that such establishments be operated only during certain
hours." 518 F.2d at 1020. When a statute sweeps too broadly, restricting First Amend-
ment rights unduly, it may be invalidated if there is a less restrictive alternative available.
Note, The Less Restrictive Alternative in Constitutional Adjudication: An Analysis, A Jus-
tification, and Some Criteria, 27 VAND. L. REV. 971, 1011-16 (1974).
34. 518 F.2d at 1018-21.
35. Id. at 1023 (Celebrezze, J., dissenting).
36. Id. at 1024-25.
37. Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
38. Id. at 73-84 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment and portions of the opin-
ion).
39. Id. at 84-88 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
40. Id. at 88-96 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
41. Id. at 58. Although the Court treated the case as involving only the rights of
the theater owners themselves, the rights of viewers of adult films were also involved.
Because adult films could be shown frequently only in licensed adult theaters, the Detroit
ordinances also restricted viewers' First Amendment rights.
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The Court initially focused on whether the theater owners had notice
that their behavior was covered by the ordinances. Both theater owners had
stipulated that they owned adult theaters as defined by the ordinances.
Neither theater owner had applied for a waiver of the provision in regard to
his establishment, nor alleged any basis for anticipating one. Therefore, the
Court reasoned that the theater owners had notice that their behavior was
covered, and could not assert standing to challenge the ordinances on their
own behalf.
Although the Court stated that these theater owners unquestionably fell
within the coverage of the ordinances,42 the owners alternatively alleged that
they had standing to assert the rights of third parties whose behavior might
be inhibited by the ordinances.43 In an extensive footnote, the Court listed
the recognized exceptions to traditional rules of standing.44 Among the
exceptions the Court listed are those situations in which a statute is over-
broad in its attempt to regulate the time, place, and manner of expression,
and those cases in which officials have enjoyed wide discretion in licensing
procedures.4" These exceptions reflect the Court's concern that an overbroad
statute may deter persons from exercising their constitutional rights. The
Court noted that restrictions have been placed on the ability to raise over-
breadth claims:4" it has said that the statute's deterrent effect on expression
42. Id. at 58-59. To be valid, a statute need not have every element of uncertainty
removed. The Supreme Court has noted that "[There are limitations in the English lan-
guage with respect to being both specific and managably brief," and has stated that as
long as the prohibitions "are set out in terms that the ordinary person exercising ordinary
common sense can sufficiently understand and comply with," the statute should not be
declared unconstitutional. Civil Service Comm'n v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 578-79
(1973).
43. 427 U.S. at 59.
44. Id. at 59 n. 17. The Court's list is taken from Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S.
601, 612-13 (1973).
45. A vague statute is always overbroad. Thus, the overbreadth cases cited by the
Court should be applicable to the vagueness challenge raised in American Mini Theatres.
Overbreadth claims primarily have been entertained in cases involving "only spoken
words," Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444
(1969); Street v. New York, 394 U.S. 576 (1969); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315
U.S. 568 (1942), but cases involving conduct are heard also. Oxerbreadth claims have
been allowed when a statute has attempted to regulate the time, place, and manner of
expressive conduct. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972); Cameron v.
Johnson, 390 U.S. 611 (1968); Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241 (1967); Thornhill v.
Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940). The Court also protects rights of association that might be
burdened by an overbroad statute. Keyishian v. Board of Regents. 385 U.S. 589 (1967);
Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479
(1960). Vagueness and overbreadth claims are also heard under the more lenient standing
requirements when officials have enjoyed wide discretion in licensing procedures.
Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536
(1965); Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290 (1951); Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444
(1938).
46. 427 U.S. at 59 n. 17. "[T]he plain import of our cases is. at the very least, that
facial overbreadth adjudication is an exception to our traditional rules of practice and that
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must be "real and substantial." 4 If the statute is "readily subject to a
narrowing construction by the state courts," 4 it may not be challenged.
Because the only vague element in the Detroit ordinances concerned the
amount of sexual activity portrayed before a film would be "characterized
by an emphasis" on sex-oriented material, the Court found no substantial
deterrent effect. Any doubt could be readily answered by a state court
construction narrowing the coverage of the ordinances. The possibility that a
state court might narrow the ordinances could justify a federal court's
abstention from interference in a pending state criminal proceeding. But
because no such proceeding was pending, the Supreme Court in American
Mini Theatres found that abstention was inapposite.49
its function, a limited one at the outset, attenuates as the otherwise unprotected behavior
that it forbids the State to sanction moves from 'pure speech' toward conduct and that
conduct-even if expressive-falls within the scope of otherwise valid criminal laws that
reflect legitimate state interests in maintaining comprehensive controls over harmful, con-
stitutionally unprotected conduct. Although such laws, if too broadly worded, may deter
protected speech to some unknown extent, there comes a point where that effect-at best
a prediction-cannot, with confidence, justify invalidating a statute on its face and so
prohibiting a State from enforcing the statute against conduct that is admittedly within its
power to proscribe." Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973).
47. 427 U.S. at 60 (quoting Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 216
(1975)).
48. Id.
49. 427 U.S. at 60-61. The Court attempted to bolster its refusal to consider the
vagueness arguments of the theater owners by alluding to the doctrine of federal non-
intervention, by which federal courts decline to intervene in state criminal proceedings
before the state court has rendered a judgment. Such deference is grounded on concerns
of federalism, comity, and equity jurisprudence. In Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479
(1965), however, the Court intervened to grant declaratory and injunctive relief. In that
case, Louisiana state officials prosecuted and threatened to prosecute a civil rights organi-
zation under Louisiana's Subversive Activities and Communist Propaganda Control Laws.
The Court held, inter alia, that because the statute was overbroad, prosecution or the
threat of it had a chilling effect on protected First Amendment speech, and protracted
criminal litigation might not vindicate the plaintiffs' constitutional rights. Id. at 486,
490-91. In addition, the statute could only be narrowed on a case-by-case basis. The or-
ganization was allowed standing to challenge the statute without a determination whether
its conduct could be regulated by a statute drawn with the requisite specificity because the
injury it suffered was deemed irreparable. Id. at 489. In Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37
(1971), the Court began to limit the scope of the federal intervention doctrine. It would
not intervene to grant injunctive relief in a pending state criminal proceeding unless the
damage was irreparable as well as "great and immediate." Id. at 46. The "chilling ef-
fect" of a state criminal statute alone was considered insufficient to warrant intervention.
Id. at 50. In Samuels v. Mackell, 401 U.S. 66 (1971), the Court held that the same
equitable principles determine whether intervention is proper in a pending state criminal
prosecution involving declaratory relief. The principles of Younger and Mackell were not
applied, however, to threatened prosecutions in Steffel v. Thompson, 416 U.S. 452
(1974). Declaratory relief against a threatened state prosecution is permissible without the
showing of bad faith prosecution required by Dombrowski as long as the plaintiff de-
monstrates a genuine threat of enforcement. Id. at 462. In Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420
U.S. 592 (1975), the Court held that federal courts should refrain from intervening in
quasi-criminal nuisance proceedings even though a party might eventually have the right
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Justice Powell concurred in this part of the Court's opinion.5" Justice
Blacknfun dissented, contending that an exhibitor of adult films would not
know whether his behavior was covered by the statute, which therefore
deters protected conduct. He concluded that the ordinances had a substantial
deterrent effect, that they were not readily subject to a narrowing construc-
tion by the state courts, and that adult material was entitled to the same
protection as all other expression protected by the First Amendment.51
2. Vagueness and Overbreadth Doctrines
The concept of vagueness derives from the Fourteenth Amendment due
process requirement of notice. Although challenges to vague laws may be
raised for several purposes, this note will discuss only the First Amendment
principles of vagueness and overbreadth that are incorporated into the Four-
teenth Amendment. A vague criminal statute is one that impinges on First
Amendment expression by failing to provide adequate standards by which a
person of average intelligence may judge his conduct. 2 A statute is over-
broad when it sweeps within its coverage protected as well as unprotected
to appeal in the federal courts on a federal claim. Id. at 605-11. The Court in Young v.
American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. 50, 61 (1976), discussed only Dombrowski, and rea-
soned that although an exhibitor might have doubts about whether a film was "charac-
terized by an emphasis" on sexual material, the threat was not sufficient to justify the
exceptional discretion exercised in granting review in Dombrowski. Dombrowski is distin-
guishable, however, because in American Mini Theatres no criminal proceeding was pend-
ing; there was only the threat of criminal prosecutions. The theater owners were entitled
to review even without a showing of bad faith prosecution, at least for declaratory relief,
under Steffel. In Juidice v. Vail, 45 U.S.L.W. 4269 (U.S. Mar. 22, 1977), the Court held
that the principles of Younger and Huffman are not confined to criminal and civil proceed-
ings. The strong federalism and comity concerns apply also to prevent federal intervention
in a state contempt proceeding. Id. at 4271-72. It is unclear whether the Court would
extend these holdings to situations where injunctive relief is requested in the face of
threatened prosecutions without a showing of bad faith prosecution.
50. 427 U.S. at 73.
51. Id. at 94-96.
52. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 41 n.48 (1976). Justice Marshall, in Grayned v.
City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972), explained the three vices of vagueness. "First,
because we assume that man is free to steer between lawful and unlawful conduct, we
insist that laws give the person of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know
what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly. Vague laws may trap the innocent by
not providing fair warning. Second, if arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is to be
prevented, laws must provide explicit standards for those who apply them. A vague law
impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolu-
tion on an ad hoc and subjective basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and dis-
criminatory application. Third, but related, where a vague statute 'abuts upon sensitive
areas of basic First Amendment freedoms,' it 'operates to inhibit the exercise of those
freedoms.' Uncertain meanings inevitably lead citizens to ' "steer far wider of the unlaw-
ful zone" . . . than if the boundaries of the forbidden areas were clearly marked.' " Id.
at 108-09 (citations omitted). See also Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Su-
preme Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 67, 68 (1960).
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speech.53 The concern in both vagueness and overbreadth cases is that the
sweeping nature of the statute might have a chilling effect because those
whose speech is protected would be hesitant to exercise their right of expres-
sion for fear of being prosecuted.54 Thus, a vague or overbroad statute is
generally invalidated unless it can be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
state interest.55 A vague statute is necessarily overbroad because due to the
ambiguity of the language it is possible to apply the statute to protected as
well as unprotected speech. A statute may be overbroad, however, and yet
not be vague; for although the behavior covered may be specified in suffi-
cient detail, some of it may be constitutionally protected.
A threshold issue to the consideration of the substantive aspects of
vagueness and overbreadth is whether a party has standing to assert these
claims. Standing decisions imply that generally a person may only challenge
a statute if the statute is unconstitutional in regard to him, provided he has
the requisite personal stake in the outcome. 6 There are, however, excep-
tions allowing a person to assert the rights of third parties: (a) when a statute,
though constitutional as applied to him, is unconstitutional as applied to
third parties coming within its scope,"7 or (b) when the constitutional rights
53. Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REV. 844,
845 n.5 (1970).
54. "[B]ecause 'the line between speech unconditionally guaranteed and speech
which may legitimately be regulated, suppressed, or punished is finely drawn,' . . . 'in
every case the power to regulate must be so exercised as not, in attaining a permissible
end, unduly to infringe the protected freedom,' . . . In other words, the statute must be
carefully drawn or be authoritatively construed to punish only unprotected speech and not
be susceptible of application to protected expression." Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518,
522 (1972).
55. "The consequences of our departure from traditional rules of standing in the
First Amendment area is that any enforcement of a statute thus placed at issue is totally
forbidden until and unless a limiting construction or partial invalidation so narrows it as to
remove the seeming threat or deterrence to constitutionally protected expression ...
Facial overbreadth has not been invoked when a limiting construction has been or could
be placed on the challenged statute." Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 613-14
(1973). See also Comment, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L.
REV. 844, 853 (1970); note 65 infra.
56. The litigant must have a personal stake in the outcome in all standing cases.
Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 97 S. Ct. 555, 561
(1977); Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26, 38 (1976);
Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 -(1975); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 214 (1962).
57. One commentator has stated: "If a party against whom a statute is sought to be
enforced can show preliminarily non-severability of application or that an attempt to sever
would leave standing a statute that would be incapable of giving fair notice of its prohibi-
tions, that party has standing to challenge the statute on the grounds that it infringes the
rights of third parties coming within its application." Sedler, Standing to Assert Constitu-
tional Jus Tertii in the Supreme Court, 71 YALE L.J. 599, 608 (1962).
A distinction must be made between jus tertii, or normal third party standing, and
standing in overbreadth cases. Overbreadth claims are heard when a claimant, although
his conduct could be regulated by a narrowly drawn statute, is allowed to assert the in-
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of third parties will be adversely affected by the outcome of the suit,"8 and
there is a close relationship between the litigant and the third party.
5 9
Included within the first exception are third parties whose standing is
allowed on the basis of the "chilling effect" of the statute.6" A litigant must
show that a statute may result in an overbroad application, having a deterrent
effect on protected conduct of third persons. In order to remove this deter-
rent effect on the fundamental right of free expression6' the Court grants the
litigant standing to challenge the legislation even though a narrowly drawn
statute could constitutionally regulate that litigant's conduct. The litigant is
allowed to assert the rights of the group he represents to protect the entire
group rather than being denied standing because his own rights are not
necessarily violated. Thus, the Court aims to preserve the exercise of impor-
tant First Amendment rights that otherwise might not be exercised for fear of
violating a statute. 2
The situations in which a litigant obtains standing because of the chill-
ing effect of a statute apparently were expanded in Dombrowski v. Pfister.63
In that case the Court stated that in two situations relief will be granted
because of the -chilling effect: first, where the statute is unconstitutional on
its face, the Court will invalidate it because its mere existence is a deterrent
to freedom of expression; second, if a valid statute is used for the purpose of
discouraging protected activity, the Court will entertain a suit for declaratory
or injunctive relief.64 If a statute is readily subject to a narrowing construc-
tion by the state courts, however, the challengers may not assert the rights of
third parties. 5
fringed constitutional rights of others not before the court. Jus tertii claims, however, are
heard when a litigant alleges that a single application of a law injures him and infringes
on the rights of third parties not before the court. Jus tertii is allowed when one or more
of three factors are present: "[F]irst, the presence of some substantial relationship be-
tween the claimant and the third parties; second, the impossibility of the rightholders' as-
serting their own constitutional rights; and third, the need to avoid a dilution of third par-
ties' constitutional rights that would result were the assertion of jus tertii not permitted."
Note, Standing to Assert Constitutional Jus Tertii, 88 HARV. L. REV. 423, 423-25
(1974).
58. See Note, Standing to Assert Constitutional Jus Tertii, 88 HARV. L. REv. 423
(1974), and cases cited therein.
59. See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 458-60 (1958). See also Eisenstadt v.
Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 446 (1972).
60. Note, The Chilling Effect in Constitutional Law, 69 COLUM. L. REV. 808,
820-21 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Chilling Effect].
61. See note 127 infra for a discussion of fundamental rights.
62. See, e.g., Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973); Cameron v. Johnson,
390 U.S. 611 (1968); Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360 (1964); NAACP v. Button, 471
U.S. 415 (1963); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960); Douglas v. City of Jeannette,
319 U.S. 157 (1943).
63. 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
64. Id. at 489-90. See Chilling Effect, supra note 60, at 813.
65. 380 U.S. at 491. In Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974), the Supreme
Court allowed a federal court to hear a request for a declaratory judgment that a statute
[Vol. 4
LEVELS OF PROTECTED SPEECH
The Court soon began to limit the scope of the chilling effect principle
in Laird v. Tatum.66 The Court there stated that when governmental regula-
tions only indirectly deter expression, a challenger of a statute must show a
threat of specific future harm."7 The Court continued its limitation inBroad-
rick v. Oklahoma,8 in which it held that a statute's deterrent effect must be
both "real and substantial." 69 Remote or tenuous possibilities of a chilling
effect on expression will not support relaxation of the standing require-
ments.
3. Application of Vagueness Doctrine
Applying the traditional vagueness principles, the Detroit ordinances
were vague, and therefore the theater owners should have had standing to
challenge the ordinances. Even though the theater owners admitted that their
theaters clearly fell within the classification of adult theaters, the author
contends that the ordinances were still vague in regard to them because
adequate standards were not provided by which they might judge their
conduct and by which waivers of the distance limitation might be granted.
Additionally, they might have been allowed third party standing to challenge
the ordinances on the basis of their possible chilling effect on protected
speech of non-adult theater owners.
Justice Blackmun's dissent details the difficulties presented by the or-
dinances. The ordinances seem to violate the due process requirement of
notice because theaters cannot determine whether their conduct is in fact
covered by the ordinances. The guidelines in the ordinances, although
perhaps adequate in detail as to areas and activities that appear in adult
films, are unclear as to what percentage of these activities and areas must be
present for a film to be "characterized by an emphasis" on such matter.7"
was invalid as applied where no state proceeding was pending, even though the state court
had not had an opportunity to narrow the statute. The Court based its decision partially on
the fact that a declaratory judgment that a statute is void on its face would interfere with
state proceedings more than the narrower judgment that a statute is invalid in a few li-
mited situations, and thus concerns of federalism and comity would hot prevent review. In
Huffman v. Pursue, Ltd., 420 U.S. 592 (1975), the Court held that a litigant must
exhaust his remedies in a state court, including obtaining a narrowing construction, before
a federal court will intervene in a state quasi-criminal nuisance proceeding. Id. at 609.
66. 408 U.S. 1 (1972). In Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971), the Court had
emphasized that the chilling effect of a statute alone was not enough to justify federal
intervention: "Moreover, the existence of a 'chilling effect,' even in the area of First
Amendment rights, has never been considered a sufficient basis, in and of itself, for pro-
hibiting state action. Where a statute does not directly abridge free speech, but-while
regulating a subject within the State's power-tends to have the incidental effect of in-
hibiting First Amendment rights, it is well settled that the statute can be upheld if the
effect on speech is minor in relation to the need for control of the conduct and the lack of
alternative means for doing so." Id. at 50-52.
67. 408 U.S. at 11.
68. 413 U.S. 601 (1973).
69. Id. at 615.
70. 427 U.S. at 88-89 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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The proprietor of a non-adult theater must decide before he shows a film
whether it contains enough of the specified material to warrant being consid-
ered an adult theater. If he plans to exhibit an adult film and is within 1,000
feet of another regulated use, he specifically must be granted a waiver as an
adult theater before he may show the film. Additionally, the proprietor of an
adult theater must ascertain whether any other theater or bookstore within
1,000 feet is an adult theater or bookstore and the character of its pre-
sentations. The status of each use must be continually re-evaluated.' These
decisions are made by each proprietor without legislative guidance, and at
the risk of criminal penalties." After two violations of the statute, if found
to be harmful to the welfare of the citizenry, the mayor may revoke the
proprietor's licence without review. 3
Several cases have found similar statutes to be vague.7 4 In one such
case, Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell,5 the Court invalidated an ordinance
requiring any person soliciting door-to-door for a recognized charitable or
political cause to give notice in writing, for purposes of identification, to the
local police department. The Court held that the ordinance, because of its
potentially inhibiting effect on speech, had not been drawn with the neces-
sary specificity. Such terms as "charitable cause" were unclear, and the
ordinance did not specify which types of organizations it was to cover. It did
not indicate what method of notice was adequate, or what types of identifica-
tion would be required. By the Hynes standard, the Detroit ordinances are
vague; a person must guess whether his behavior is covered by the ordi-
nances." Such ordinances operate as potential deterrents to freedom of
expression because, rather than risk criminal penalties, a theater owner
might well eschew the exhibition of a sex-oriented film."
As Justice Blackmun points out, the Detroit ordinances are vague in
that they do not specify standards by which city officials may grant or deny
waivers of the 1,000 foot provision. 8 Other statutes have been invalidated
71. Id. at 90.
72. See note 22 supra.
73. See note 20 supra.
74. See, e.g., Coates v. Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971). in which an ordinance
that made it a crime for "three or more persons to assemble . . . on any of the sidewalks
• . . and there conduct themselves in a manner annoying to persons passing by" was
invalidated because no standard of conduct was clearly specified. In Baggett v. Bullitt,
377 U.S. 360 (1964), the Supreme Court considered statutes that required a person desir-
ing to be a state employee to take loyalty oaths and to affirm the Constitution and the
United States and state laws, and to swear he had respect for the flag and that he was not
a subversive person. The Court found the statutes vague because they did not specify a
requirement that a person know that his teaching, in this case that of a schoolteacher,
might cause overthrow of the government.
75. 425 U.S. 610 (1976). See also 427 U.S. at 88-96 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
76. 427, U.S. at 92-94 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
77. Id. at 90.
78. Id. at 91-92.
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because of such inadequate standards.7" One provision of the Detroit ordi-
nances allows the mayor to refuse or revoke a license if he finds the applic-
ant has violated the ordinances or a criminal statute within the past two years
in a way that evidences a flagrant disregard for the welfare of the citizens.8"
The mayor therefore has unreviewable discretion to grant or refuse licenses
if the proprietor has previously violated the ordinance. The mayor is allowed
to define "flagrant disregard for the welfare of the citizens" with no
statutorily defined standards on which to base his definition. Further, a
waiver of the 1,000 foot provision can be granted by the City Plan Commis-
sion only if the establishment is not "contrary to the public interest" or
"against the spirit and intent" of the ordinance. No more definite standards
are given and no opportunity for review is specifically provided. The unbri-
dled discretion of officials could have a chilling effect on the exercise of
First Amendment rights. Applicants for licenses or waivers could be dis-
couraged because of the likelihood of arbitrary denial. A later challenge by a
proprietor on the ground of abuse of discretion would be time-consuming
and expensive."
In denying review of the vagueness issue the Court relied on Parker v.
Levy,82 which held that a person whose conduct is squarely covered by an
ordinance may not assert third party standing to challenge it. Parker upheld
the conviction of Levy, an Army physician, for making public statements
urging black enlisted men to refuse orders to go to Vietnam, and for refer-
ring to Special Forces personnel by such derogatory terms as "liars and
thieves" and "killers of women and peasants," in violation of the Uniform
Code of Military Justice. 3 The Court held that third party standing would
not be extended to Levy because he was aware that his conduct was covered
by the Code, and the military courts had narrowed the statute. Because of the
military's unique system of justice, the holding in Parker clearly should be
79. In Gelling v. Texas, 343 U.S. 960 (1952), an ordinance allowing a board to
deny a license to a film "of such character as to be prejudicial to the best interests of the
people of said city," was held to be invalid on the ground of vagueness. In Interstate
Circuit, Inc. v. Dallas, 390 U.S. 676 (1968), the Court invalidated as vague due to in-
adequate standards an ordinance authorizing a board to classify films as to whether they
were "suitable for young persons." The Board was to so classify films portraying "sex-
ual promiscuity" which in its judgment was "likely to incite or encourage delinquency or
sexual promiscuity on the part of young persons or appeal to their prurient interest." Id.
at 691-92. In Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969), the Court overturned a
permit requirement for parades because the permit could be refused if the city commission
believed the public welfare, peace, safety, health, decency and good order, morals, or
convenience required that it be refused.
80. See note 20 supra.
81. See Chilling Effect, supra note 60, at 827-28.
82. 417 U.S. 733 (1974).
83. 10 U.S.C. § 890 (1970) (U.C.M.S. art. 90); id. § 933 (art. 133), id. § 934
(art. 134).
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limited to military cases.8 4 It would seem that the theater owners, as civi-
lians, are,not governed by the Parker rule and should be able to assert third
party standing.
85
The theater owners should have been granted third party standing to
challenge the ordinances even though their own behavior was covered,
based on the chilling effect of the ordinances. The Court could have invoked
the first prong of the Dombrowski v. Pfister86 holding: a statute unconstitu-
tional on its face could be invalidated because of its potential deterrence of
protected expression, 7 The Detroit ordinances are vague on their face be-
cause it is unclear what behavior they cover, and no standards for official
decisionmaking are provided. Standing possibly should be granted to a
litigant in such a case with no requirement that he show that the prosecution
was pursued in bad faith as in Dombrowski.88
It is likely, however, that the theaters would not have surmounted the
hurdles to obtain third party standing to allege that the Detroit ordinances
had a chilling effect. The ordinances had not been narrowed by the state
court, as preferred in Dombrowski.89 The Supreme Court for that reason
might refuse to review the ordinances for vagueness. The specific threat of
harm required by Laird v. Tatum90 was present, however. The theaters had
been notified that their exhibition of adult films was in violation of the
ordinances and that they faced possible criminal prosecution.
It would appear that the criterion of a substantial deterrent effect set
out in Broadrick v. Oklahoma9 is met. Both adult and non-adult theater
owners must determine whether their establishment is within 1,000 feet of
another regulated use before they show a movie which could possibly be
characterized as having an emphasis on sex. Both types of theaters might be
deterred by the standardless discretion granted to officials to grant licenses
and waivers. A non-adult theater may forego the exhibition of any films with
an orientation toward sex if the exhibition of such a film might cause him to
84. See, e.g., Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828 (1976), which upheld the denial of a
request from several left-wing candidates to speak in restricted areas of Fort Dixon, New
Jersey. In his concurrence, Justice Powell emphasized that military activities are not gov-
erned by democratic procedures. The legitimate interest of the public in maintaining the
reality and appearance of political neutrality of the armed services outweighed the inter-
ests of political candidates and their servicemen audience in the availability of a military
base for campaign activities. Id. at 844-48. See also EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF
FREEDOM OF ExPRESSION 57 (1970). In similar situations, restrictions on the rights of
federal employees have been justified in the interest of political neutrality. Civil Service
Comm'n v. Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973).
85. See 427 U.S. at 94-96 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
86. 380 U.S. 479 (1965).
87. See text accompanying notes 63-65 supra.
88. See Chilling Effect, supra note 60, at 816-18.
89. See notes 63-65 and accompanying text supra.
90. See notes 66-67 and accompanying text supra.
91. 413 U.S. 601 (1973). See text accompanying notes 68-69 supra.
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be labeled an unlicensed "adult" theater in violation of the ordinances. The
Court inAmerican Mini Theatres indicated, however, that the lesser value of
the speech in question implied that it did not deserve such close review
because the right to receive or communicate such speech is not entitled to as
much protection as other kinds of speech. Thus, although a definite showing
of harm and deterrence may be made, the fact that the statute has not been
narrowed caused the Court to refrain from review of the vagueness issue.
The numerous requirements that a litigant must meet to obtain standing
to challenge a statute because of its chilling effect preclude review except in
the most extreme cases. The Court's unwillingness to review the vagueness
and overbreadth arguments indicates its desire not to extend standing based
on these challenges. The American Mini Theatres case might be seen, how-
ever, as a decision not to review the issue because of the facts of the case.
The theaters had stipulated that they were adult theaters. Thus, the question
of the impact of the statute on non-adult theaters was precluded, thereby
narrowing the grounds for review of the vagueness issue. The Court could
then as mater of policy refuse to review the issue.92
92. The Court's refusal to review the Detroit ordinances in spite of their possible
chilling effect raises questions about the Court's inconsistent treatment of vagueness
claims. One commentator has argued that the doctrine of vagueness is used by the Su-
preme Court to create a buffer zone of added protection at the peripheries of several of
the Bill of Rights freedoms. Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme
Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 67, 75 (1960). "These considerations will suggest that the
void-for-vagueness doctrine may be regarded less as a principle regulating the permissible
relationship between written law and the potential offender than as a practical instrument
mediating between, on the one hand, all of the organs of public coercion of a state, and,
on the other, the institution of federal protection of the individual's private interests." Id.
at 81.
The concerns that determine whether the Court will entertain a vagueness challenge
in its balancing of these interests appear to be: (1) whether the statute is more uncertain than
the average statute; (2) the nature of the individual freedom at stake; (3) the probability of
its violation; (4) the potential deterrent effect of irregular applications of the statute and
violation of the individual right on the exercise of that right; (5) the practical power of the
Court to supervise the application of the statute; and (6) the necessity of ad hoc judg-
ments. The Court in American Mini Theatres apparently did not deem these factors impor-
tant if it considered them at all. First, the fact that the areas and activities covered by the
ordinances were specifically described in the ordinances militated against vagueness re-
view. The requirement that the films be "characterized by an emphasis" on sexual mate-
rial before they would be covered by the statute, however, is clearly vague. As Hynes v.
Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610 (1976), illustrates; the requirements of the Detroit ordi-
nances are no less uncertain than other ordinances which have been invalidated. The
Court in American Mini Theatres decided, however, that the only vagueness in the ordi-
nances concerned the amount of sexually explicit material a theater could show before it
was considered adult. This question could be readily answered in the state courts. 427
U.S. at 61. Second, although First Amendment interests generally are regarded as funda-
mental, the Court decided that sexually-oriented materials deserve less protection than
other types of expression. Therefore, because of content, what would be an interest de-
serving close review did not merit examination for vagueness. Id. Justice Blackmun noted
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B. Prior Restraint
1. The Supreme Court's Disposition
The theater owners alleged that the ordinances constituted prior re-
straints because inadequate procedures were provided for the granting of
licenses and waivers.93 The city of Detroit acknowledged that the ordinances
prohibited theaters not licensed as adult from exhibiting sex-oriented
films.94 The majority held that because the theaters were restricted only as to
location, the slight degree of prior restraint did not justify invalidating the
ordinances. An indefinite number of adult theaters were permitted in the city
as long as they complied with the zoning ordinances and obtained a license.
The majority pointed to the city's interest in the quality of its neighborhoods
as justification for regulating material protected by the First Amendment.95
in his dissent, "As to the third reason, that 'adult' material is simply entitled to less pro-
tection, it certainly explains the lapse in applying settled vagueness principles, as indeed it
explains this whole case." Id. at 96 (Blackman, J., dissenting). Third, the Court indicated
that even if the individual rights involved were likely to be violated, they could easily be
vindicated by a narrowing construction of the ordinances by the state courts on a case-
by-case basis. 427 U.S. at 61. Since there had been no narrowing construction attempted,
the Court was reluctant to invalidate all of the ordinances. Fourth, although* the system
would seem to approach censorship if it induced exhibitors to forego exhibition of pro-
tected films because they are unable to determine to what extent these films or the films
of their neighbors are covered by the ordinances, the Court indicated that the potential
deterrent effects are slight compared with the limited value of the expression. Id. See id.
at 88 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). "Since there is surely a less vital interest in the uninhi-
bited exhibition of material that is on the borderline between pornography and artistic ex-
pression than in the free dissemination of ideas of social and political significance, and
since the limited amount of uncertainty in the ordinances is easily susceptible of a narrow-
ing construction, we think this is an inappropriate case in xhich to adjudicate the
hypothetical claims of persons not before the Court." 427 U.S. at 61. The city's interest
in controlling this form of expression because of its harmful effect on neighborhoods was
deemed overwhelming. Id. at 71-73. Fifth, the Court did not seem concerned about lower
court supervision of the ordinances, perhaps due to federalism concerns. Id. at 71. Fi-
nally, the Court implied that possible ad hoe judgments by local officials are justifiable in
the city's attempt to preserve the viability of its neighborhoods. Id. at 61. The exercise of
freedoms such as that of expression thus seem to depend on a municipality's ability to
maintain the public order.
This overview of the criteria often deemed important in the Court's decisions to hear
a vagueness challenge may indicate that such a refusal is a policy decision and that the
merits of the claims are not closely scrutinized. In American Mini Theatres the right to
exhibit and view adult movies in any location was considered less important than the
city's interest in preserving the quality of the neighborhoods surrounding adult theaters.
Resolution of the problems adult theaters cause was considered best left to the cities
themselves, there being no clear solution to this conflict. Id. at 71.
93. Brief for Respondent at 33-36, Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427
U.S. 50 (1976).
94. 427 U.S. at 62. Justice Blackmun recognized that the Detroit ordinances consti-
tuted a prior restraint, but he chose to emphasize what he considered the more glaring
defect of vagueness. Id. at 91 n.4. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
95. 427 U.S. at 62-63.
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2. The Doctrine of Prior Restraint
Historically, officials cannot regulate speech on the basis of its con-
tent."6 Under limited circumstances, however, a prior restraint, which is an
attempt to restrain before publication the expression or publication of mate-
rial on the basis of its content, may be allowed.97 Prior restraints are not
unconstitutional per se.9 s Any system of prior restraints, however, "comes
to [the] Court bearing a heavy presumption against its constitutional valid-
ity," 9 9 because our society would prefer to punish persons after their expres-
sion is determined to transgress the law.'
A prior restraint, to be valid, must first fit within one of a few limited
exceptions. These exceptions include war-time secrets, prior censorship of
films, reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions on expression in
public places, and situations in which rights of individuals in surrounding
areas are violated, or in which there is a captive audience. 1"' Second, a prior
restraint must be accomplished with procedural safeguards that reduce the
danger of suppressing constitutionally protected speech.' In this regard the
Court has stated:
We held in Freedman, and we reaffirm here, that a system of prior
restraint runs afoul of the First Amendment if it lacks certain safeguards:
96. See, e.g., Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior Restraint, 20 L. & CONTEMP. SOC.
PROB. 648, 655 (1955), in which the author asserts that it is a general presumption of our
society that freedom of expression is the rule and restraint is the exception.
97. Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 n.10 (1963). See Times Film
Corp. v. Chicago, 365 U.S. 43, 49-50 (1961); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716
(1931).
98. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 558 (1975).
99. Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan, 372 U.S. 58, 70 (1963).
100. See Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 559 (1975).
"Under a system of subsequent punishment, the communication has already been made
before the government takes action; it thus takes its place, for whatever it may be worth,
in the marketplace of ideas. Under a system of prior restraint, the communication, if ban-
ned, never'reaches the marketplace at all. Or the communication may be withheld until
the issue of its release is finally settled, at which time it may have become obsolete and
unprofitable. Such a delay is particularly serious in certain areas-such as motion
pictures-where large investments may be involved." Emerson, The Doctrine of Prior
Restraint, 20 L. & CONTEMP. SOC. PROB. 648, 657 (1955).
101. See, e.g., Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (war-time secrets); Times
Film Corp. v. Chicago, 365 U.S. 43 (1961) (prior censorship of films); Cox v. New
Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941); Poulos v. New Hampshire, 345 U.S. 395 (1953) (rea-
sonable time, place and manner restrictions such as permits on expression in public
places); Cameron v. Johnson, 390 U.S. 611 (1968); Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39
(1966) (use of a facility primarily serving a competing use); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S.
77 (1949) (rights of individuals in the surrounding areas violated); Lehman v. City of
Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974) (captive audience).
102. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 559 (1975). For a
discussion of standards for official decisionmaking, see text accompanying notes 112-14
infra. See also Monaghan, First Amendment "Due Process," 83 HARV. L. REV. 518,
518-20 (1970).
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First, the burden of instituting judicial proceedings, and of proving that
the material is unprotected, must rest on the censor. Second, any restraint
prior to judicial review can be imposed only for a specified brief period
and only for the purpose of preserving the status quo. Third, a prompt
final judicial determination must be assured."' 3
3. Application of Prior Restraint Doctrine
One of the limited exceptions was employed by the Court in Kovacs v.
Cooper,"4 which upheld a prior restraint under circumstances similar to
those in American Mini Theatres. The Kovacs ordinance barred from public
streets vehicles emitting "loud and raucous" noises. The Court held that the
residents, a captive audience, suffered an invasion of the quiet of their
homes by being forced to hear these noises."0 5 In the American Mini
Theatres case, it was demonstrated in the trial court that adult businesses, if
concentrated in a particular area, would have a detrimental effect on sur-
rounding property values. Experience in cities such as Boston indicates that,
when sex-oriented businesses become more prominent in a neighborhood,
residents feel less neighborhood pride.10 6 A belief that the neighborhood will
deteriorate causes real estate prices to drop, businesses and residents to
move from the area, and the crime rate to rise."0 7 The detrimental effect on
property and aesthetic values thus arguably justifies a prior restraint in this
case.
The Detroit ordinances, however, do not meet the second requirement
of a justifiable prior restraint; they lack adequate procedural safeguards.
Although they impose no direct censorship, they have the effect of a prior
restraint in that they discourage protected conduct. The Detroit ordinances
deter protected conduct in three respects: adequate standards for granting
licenses and waivers are lacking, prompt judicial review is not provided, and
a theater owner cannot accurately judge whether his conduct is covered by
the ordinances.
Every motion picture exhibitor must obtain a license before he is al-
lowed to exhibit any film, and denial of a license may be based on the
mayor's determination that the proposed theater intends to show adult films.
The mayor must determine whether the applicant has violated any city
ordinances or state criminal statutes within the last two years in a way that
"evidences a flagrant disregard for the safety or welfare of either the pat-
rons, employees, or persons residing or doing business nearby."' 0 s This
indefinite standard might discourage potential applicants because of the fear
103. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 560 (1975).
104. 336 U.S. 77 (1949).
105. Id. at 87.
106. See NEWSWEEK, Dec. 6, 1976, at 35.
107. Appendix to Supreme Court Briefs at 16-50, Young v. American Mini
Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
108. See not& 20 supra.
[Vol. 4
that some past action might in the mayor's judgment evidence a flagrant
disregard for the public welfare. It is unclear whether the ordinance requires
a prior conviction. The mayor can also revoke an existing license of any
non-adult theater under the "flagrant disregard" standard;.. 9 this could deter
non-adult theater owners from exhibiting even one adult film.' The deterr-
ence becomes even more likely because any person who violates the ordi-
nances is also subject to the criminal penalty of a fine or jail sentence."'
In Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad,"2 the Court reversed a
state court determination upholding a decision by the directors of a munici-
pal theater in Chattanooga to reject the application of Southeastern Promo-
tions to stage the musical "Hair". The Court held that the refusal to allow
use of the theater constituted a prior restraint under a system that lacked
minimum procedural safeguards. The opinion reasoned:
Invariably, the Court has felt obliged to condemn systems in which
the exercise of such authority was not bounded by precise and clear
standards. The reasoning has been, simply, that the danger of censorship
and of abridgement of our precious First Amendment freedoms is too
great where officials have unbridled discretion over a forum's use. Our
distaste for censorship-reflecting the natural distaste of a free people-
is deep-written in our law." 3
Similar considerations seem applicable in American Mini Theatres. The
standards used by officials to determine whether a movie was meant to be
regulated under the ordinances seem inadequate in that they lack specificity,
109. For a case raising the issue of standards given to officials, see, e.g., Shuttles-
worth v. Birmingham, 394 U.S. 147 (1969), in which a Birmingham ordinance prohibit-
ing parades without a permit was invalidated because a provision that a permit would be
refused if the city thought the parade would not be for the "public welfare, peace, safety,
health, decency, good order, morals, or convenience" was deemed to delegate a standard-
less discretionary power to city officals. Id. at 149-50.
110. "The threat'of sanctions may deter their exercise almost as potently as the
actual application of sanctions." NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963). In Joseph
Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952), a New York law that forbade exhibition of
any motion picture without a license was held invalid because a license could be denied if
a film was considered "sacrilegious." Id. at 506. In Interstate Circuit, Inc. v. Dallas, 390
U.S. 676 (1968), a board was authorized to classify motion pictures as suitable for young
persons if the film did not portray (1) brutality, criminal violence, or depravity in such a
manner as likely to incite young persons to crime or delinquency, or (2) "sexual promis-
cuity or extra-marital or abnormal sexual relations in such manner as . . . likely to incite
or encourage delinquency or sexual promiscuity on the part of young persons or appeal to
their prurient interest." Id. at 681. The film was unsuitable if it was likely to convey the
message that such behavior was acceptable. Terms such as "sexual promiscuity" and
"acceptable" were not defined, and the Court held that the ordinance was void because it
did not provide narrowly drawn and definite standards for officials to follow. Id. at 690.
See also Marcus v. Search Warrant, 367 U.S. 717 (1961).
111. See note 22 supra.
112. 420 U.S. 546 (1975).
113. Id. at 553.
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thereby granting unbridled discretion to officials." 4 Also, the adult films
shown by the theaters in American Mini Theatres, which led to the threat of
prosecution under the ordinances, had not been determined obscene by a
court. In Southeastern the municipal theater directors' decision denied the
production company the use of a public forum in advance of expression. In
that case the Court argued that any obscenity could be prosecuted after it
occurred. Both cases therefore involved a prior restraint imposed without
procedural safeguards."'
The provision that grants waivers to the distance limitation is another
example of the chilling effect of indefinite standards. To obtain a waiver, the
applicant must show that the proposed use will not be contrary to the
public interest or injurious to nearby properties, that it will not create a
"skid row" area, and that it will not be contrary to any program of
neighborhood conservation or urban renewal."' These provisions them-
selves discourage application for a waiver. It is unclear what the public
interest is, how one serves it, and what constitutes a "skid row" area. In
addition, the burden of showing compliance is placed on the applicant rather
than on the government where it properly belongs. 1
The Detroit ordinances also do not provide for prompt judicial review
of the status of a film. The only path of review is through the regular court
system, a potentially lengthy process. In Freedman v. Maryland,"' the
Court found one section of an ordinance requiring prior submission of films
for licensing invalid due to the failure of the ordinance to provide for a
prompt administrative or judicial decision on the obscenity of the film."'
114. 427 U.S. at 91-92 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
115. Although Southeastern involved the use of a public forum, the same pro-
cedural safeguards should be available with regard to private property. Greater latitude is
allowed when a person seeks to exercise his freedom of expression on his own property.
See, e.g., Stanley v. Georgia, 399 U.S. 557 (1969), in which the court held that a person
may view in his home obscene films that the state may prohibit from exhibition to the
general public. American Mini Theatres might be distinguished from Southeastern in that
the exercise of First Amendment rights on private property had a profound effect on the
surrounding area. This is not a justification, however, for allowing protected conduct to
be chilled as a result of inadequate procedural safeguards. No matter where rights of ex-
pression may be exercised, their deprivation should be accompanied by rigorous pro-
cedural safeguards.
116. See note 19 supra.
117. See notes 12-22 supra.
118. 380 U.S. 51 (1965).
119. Id. at 55, 60. Judicial, rather than administrative, determination of the obscen-
ity of a film is essential. "Freedman's preference for judicial evaluation of first amend-
ment claims rests upon the most fundamental considerations-the inherent institutional
differences between courts and administrative agencies, no matter how judicial the ad-
ministrative proceedings may be. First, long judicial tenure frees judges, in most cases,
from direct political pressures. Judicial insulation encourages impartial decision-making;
more importantly, it permits the courts to take the 'long view' of issues. Administrative
bodies, particularly at a state level, are rarely so insulated; indeed, they are often seen
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Southeastern emphasizes that prior restraints must be delineated so as not to
infringe unduly on First Amendment rights. Under the requirements of the
Detroit ordinances, after a theater owner decides that he wishes to show
adult movies, he must obtain a license to do so to avoid a violation of the
ordinance. The films in question are not necessarily obscene, yet they would
have to be determined "adult" or "not adult" in a proceeding for a de-
claratory judgment or an injunction instituted by the theater owner. The
non-adult theater owner could be subject to two prosecutions: one for show-
ing an adult film and one for showing an obscene film. No prompt and final
judicial determination is assured if an exhibitor is uncertain as to the classifi-
cation of a film he wishes to show.' The expense and time of litigating the
acceptability of each film in practice precludes judicial review of each film
with some sexual content.'' The Detroit ordinances also fail to provide for
prompt judicial review of administrative decisions. The normal route is
through the court system, and the scope of review is limited.'22
The Detroit ordinances also operate as a prior restraint because they
discourage a licensed exhibitor of non-adult films from showing any film
that may be characterized as "adult." Films may be characterized as adult
regardless of artistic value or critical acclaim.' 23 If a theater is within 1,000
feet of another regulated use, exhibition of an adult film is a violation of the
ordinances. Films might not be exhibited if theater owners are uncertain
whether such an exhibition will be covered by the statute. Therefore, the
deterrent effect of the provisions operates as would a prior restraint. 124 In
primarily as political organs. Second, the role of the administrator is not that of the impar-
tial adjudicator but that of the expert-a role which necessarily gives an administrative
agency a narrow and restricted viewpoint. . . .Courts, on the other hand, do not suffer
congenitally from this myopia; their general jurisdiction gives them a broad perspective
which no agency can have." Monaghan, First Amendment "Due Process," 83 HARV. L.
REV. 518, 522-23 (1970).
120. "The teaching of our cases is that, because only a judicial determination in an
adversary proceeding ensures the necessary sensitivity to freedom of expression, only a
procedure requiring a judicial determination suffices to impose a valid final restraint."
Freedman v. Maryland, 380 U.S. 51, 58 (1960).
121. Courts see delay in the availability of judicial review as tantamount to no jud-
icial relief at all. Monaghan, First Amendment "Due Process," 83 HARv. L. REV. 518,
532 (1970).
122. MICH. CONST, art. VI, § 28 provides that on appeal, review of administrative
decisions is limited to the question of whether the administrative board acted on the basis
of law, and whether its action was supported by the record. This in effect means that the
decision will not be overturned unless the board acted arbitrarily or abused its discretion.
123. In Jenkins v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153 (1974), the Court held that the film Car-
nal Knowledge was not obscene. The distributor had been convicted in the state court of
distributing an obscene film. The Supreme Court reasoned that a film that does not focus
on ultimate sexual acts, and that shows only occasional nudity, is not obscene under the
Miller standard. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973). It must, therefore, be artis-
tic expression even though it involves sex-related material.
124. See, e.g., Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940), in which the Court
held that it was unconstitutional to require that anyone who wished to solicit aid for a
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Bantam Books, Inc. v. Sullivan,1"' the Court held invalid a system of infor-
mal censorship that operated as a prior restraint of freedom of speech. A
commission determined that certain books were obscene, and reported these
titles to the distributors. The distributor stopped shipment on these books
rather than risk possible criminal prosecution based on the commission's
recommendation to the Attorney General. Similarly, in American Mini
Theatres, the theater owners might restrain their conduct in response to the
ordinances. Thus the Detroit ordinances are a prior restraint in that they
deter protected expression, provide inadequate standards for official de-
cisionmaking, and do not guarantee prompt judicial review.
C. Levels of First Amendment Protection
1. The Supreme Court's Disposition
The theater owners alleged that the Detroit ordinances violated the
equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment because they placed
theaters in different classes based on the content of their exhibitions. The
owners claimed that such a classification is neither rationally related to a
valid public purpose, nor justified by a compelling governmental interest. 26
Writing for four members of the Court, Justice Stevens rejected these
claims. Although regulation of theaters oil the basis of the content of their
exhibitions would violate the equal protection clause if all theaters were
similarly situated, 27 the Court stated that adult theaters could be classified
religious cause obtain a permit because local authorities had discretion to determine what
a religious cause was, and applicants, therefore, could not tell if their conduct was cov-
ered by the statute.
125. 372 U.S. 58 (1963).
126. Brief for Respondent at 49, Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427
U.S. 50 (1976).
127. The basic premise of equal protection theory is that a law, to be acceptable,
must classify together those who are similarly situated. Comment, Developments in the
Law: Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065, 1076 (1969). The Court has developed
a two-tiered test of equal protection. At the first level a statute merits "strict scrutiny" if
it infringes on fundamental rights or involves a suspect classification. Any classification
based on race, (Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967)), alienage, (Graham v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971)), or lineage, (Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475
(1954)), is suspect, and requires a heavy burden of justification before it will be sus-
tained. Examples of rights that have been held to be fundamental are freedom of expres-
sion, (Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939)), the right to travel, (Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 619 (1969)), the right to vote, (Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330
(1972)), the right to procreate, (Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942)), and certain
rights of criminal defendants, (Williams v. Illinois, 399 U.S. 235 (1970)). At this level of
scrutiny, the state has the burden of demonstrating that the statute promotes a compelling
governmental interest, and that there is no reasonable method of achieving those goals
with a lesser burden on constitutionally protected activity. The Court has, however, re-
fused to expand the number of suspect classifications and fundamental rights beyond the
few mentioned, perhaps because the test has resulted in extremely divergent treatment of
statutes. If a fundamental right or suspect classification is present, strict review is re-
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separately because of their effect on the surrounding neighborhoods and
because of the limited social value of sex-oriented expression.128 The clas-
sification, then, seems wholly based on content. The Court stated that the
content of protected First Amendment speech and its effect on the surround-
ing neighborhoods justifies accordingly less protection to sex-oriented mate-
rials than to other types of speech." 9 Justice Stevens stated that speech has
often been regulated on the basis of content. He used as examples war
information about troops, ' 3  speech that incites to crime,'13' and "fighting
words,"'3 2 all of which have been determined to be unprotected speech on
the basis of content. Within the area of protected speech, several regulations
have been based on content. He cites libel as an example of speech regulated
on this basis.' 33 Cases upholding a prohibition of the sale or distribution of
adult materials to minors, defining these materials as obscene in regard to
them, provide other examples of the regulation of protected speech on the
basis of content.' Stevens pointed to cases dealing with commercial speech
as justifying limited protection for speech with a certain content.' 35
quired; a statute rarely survives such review. If the statute does not require strict review,
it is usually upheld. Comment, Equal Protection in Transition: An Analysis and a Pro-
posal, 41 FoRDHAM L. REV. 605, 611 (1973).
A statute not impinging on fundamental rights or discriminating on the basis of sus-
pect classes is evaluated under the "rational relationship" standard. Courts overturn such
statutes only if they fail to exhibit any rational relationship to a conceivable purpose of
the statute. The burden of proving the unreasonableness of the classification is on the in-
dividual. Id. at 610-11.
It is unclear what standard the Court is now using to evaluate equal protection
claims. For example, in some recent cases, the Court seemed to abandon its two-tier test,
and invalidated statutes under the rationality standard. See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429
U.S. 190 (1976); Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975); Reed v. Reed, 404
U.S. 71 (1971).
128. 427 U.S. 50, 70-73 (1976).
129. Id. at 70-71.
130. Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
131. Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116 (1966); Harisiad6s v. Shaughnessy, 342 U.S.
580 (1952); Musser v. Utah, 333 U.S. 95 (1948).
132. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 558 (1942).
133. In New York Times, Inc. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), a public official
was denied recovery of damages for libel, absent proof of malice, from a critic of his
official conduct. The requirement of malice for defamation of public officials is based
both on the public nature of the speech and the public need to know about official con-
duct. The Sullivan holding was expanded in Gertz v. Robdrt Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323
(1974), in which the Court stated that defamation of private individuals was not protected
by the First Amendment. Private persons include public personalities who have not been
significantly involved in a newsworthy event.
134. E.g., Ginsberg v. New York, 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
135. 427 U.S. 56 n.31. In Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Con-
sumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976), the Court held that advertising of prescription drug
prices is protected commercial speech. In Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S.
298 (1974), the Court held that a municipal policy of refusing to accept political advertis-
ing for display on rapid transit vehicles did not violate the First Amendment because due
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These types of speech, the opinion suggests, are entitled to partial but
not complete protection under the First Amendment because they impliedly
have less social value.136 Justice Stevens asserted that adult films do not add
much to the marketplace of ideas; political speech, on the other hand, is
recognized as essential to the maintenance of a democratic society. 13' He
stated:
[E]ven though we recognize that the First Amendment will not tolerate
the total suppression of erotic materials that have some arguably artistic
social value, it is manifest that society's interest in protecting this type of
expression is of a wholly different, and lesser, magnitude than the inter-
est in untrammeled political debate that inspired Voltaire's immortal
comment. Whether political oratory or philosophical discussion moves
us to applaud or despise what is said, every schoolchild can understand
why our duty to defend the right to speak remains the same. But few of
us would march our sons and daughters off to war to preserve the citi-
zen's right to see "Specified Sexual Activities" exhibited in the theaters
of our choice.' 38
In the Court's opinion, because adult films have less social value, exhibition
of sex-oriented films is not a fundamental right and regulations concerning
their exhibition are not subject to strict scrutiny. The plurality opinion held
that although adult films were entitled to some protection, the state could use
the content of such materials to classify adult theaters differently from other
theaters. The opinion found that there was a "factual basis" for the city's
interest in preserving the character of its neighborhoods, and that this inter-
est deserved "high respect," indicating minimal scrutiny.'39 Therefore, the
Court found no violation of the equal protection clause.
140
Justice Powell did not concur in the equal protection section of the
decision.14 ' Because it commanded the assent of only four members of the
to its commercial nature rapid transit is not a public forum, and cities have an interest in
protecting the involuntary recipient from the "blare" of political speech. Other advertis-
ing cases could possibly be read as allowing regulation on the basis of content. In Mar-
kham Advertising Co. v. State, 73 Wash. 2d 405, 439 P.2d 248 (1968), appeal dismis-
sed, 393 U.S. 316 (1969) (dismissed for want of a substantial federal question), a state
statute allowed billboards in the neighborhood to advertise local businesses only. The
Court cited NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575 (1969), which held that a com-
pany may express its opinions on union activities so long as expression contains no threat
of reprisal.The Court cited Jacob Siegel Co. v. FTC, 327 U.S. 608 (1946); FTC v. Na-
tional Comm'n on Egg Nutrition, 517 F.2d 485 (7th Cir. 1975); E. F. Drew & Co. v.
FTC, 235 F.2d 735, 740 (2d Cir. 1956), as indicating that false advertising may be regu-
lated on the basis of its content.
136. 427 U.S. at 63-73.
137. 427 U.S. at 70.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 71.
140. Id. at 71-73.
141. Id. at 73 n. 1. (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment and portions of the
opinion.)
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Court, it is unclear what significance the creation of a lower level of pro-
tected speech will have for other types of speech.
2. First Amendment Protection
The plurality opinion involved two assumptions unsupported by past
First Amendment law. First, that speech may be regulated on the basis of
content and second, that certain speech is deserving of less protection.
The effect created by certain types of speech has been used to justify
the regulation of the time, place, and manner of expressive conduct."4 2 It has
always been maintained, however, that such regulation must be content-
neutral,' 43 and recent cases have expressly so stated. In Police Department
of Chicago v. Mosley,"' an ordinance banned all picketing, except labor
picketing, within 150 feet of a school to preserve quiet and order in the
classrooms. The Court held that the distinction between labor and other
types of picketing violated the equal protection clause. Picketing for any
purpose could disturb the functioning of the classroom: 'But, above all else,
the First Amendment means that government has no power to restrict ex-
pression because of its message, its ideas, its subject matter or its con-
tent."1
45
Similarly, Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville... overturned a Jackson-
ville, Florida ordinance on the ground that it impermissibly regulated ex-
pression on the basis of content. The ordinance provided that it would be a
public nuisance for the user or owner of any drive-in theater in the city to
exhibit any motion picture involving nudity if the motion picture was visible
from any public place. The ordinance was struck down as an attempt to
regulate freedom of expression directly on the basis of content; no legitimate
governmental interest was found. The city attempted to justify the ordinance
as a traffic regulation, but the Court rejected this contention because the
exhibition of similarly distracting films with non-adult subject matters was
not prohibited.' Any annoyance to unwilling viewers who might pass by
142. Virginia Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748, 771 (1976); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104 (1972); Feiner v. New
York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949); Cox v. New Hamp-
shire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941).
143. Justice Stewart stated in his dissent, "What this case does involve is the con-
stitutional impermissibility of selective interference with protected speech whose content is
thought to produce distasteful effects. It is elementary that a prime function of the First
Amendment is to guard against just such interference." 427 U.S. at 85 (Stewart, J., dis-
senting).
144. 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
145. Id. at 95.
146. 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
147. Id. at 214-15.
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would be minimal because people who did not want to see nudity could
simply avert their eyes. 4 ' The Court justified its decision as follows:
[W]hen the government, acting as censor, undertakes selectively to
shield the public from some kinds of speech on the ground that they are
more offensive than others, the First Amendment strictly limits its
power. . . .Such selective restrictions have been upheld only when the
speaker intrudes on the privacy of the home . . . or the degree of
captivity makes it impractical for the unwilling viewer or auditor to avoid
exposure .
Much that we encounter offends our esthetic, if not our political and
moral, sensibilities. Nevertheless, the Constitution does not permit gov-
ernment to decide which types of otherwise protected speech are suffi-
ciently offensive to require protection for the unwilling listener or vie-
wer.
149
The Court has also indicated clearly that speech that is classified as
protected is entitled to the full protection of the First Amendment. In Roth v.
United States,"' the Court emphasized that while obscene speech is unpro-
tected, all other types of speech are fully and equally protected:
All ideas having even the slightest redeeming social importance-
unorthodox ideas, controversial ideas, even ideas hateful to the prevail-
ing climate of opinion-have the full protection of the guaranties, unless
excludable because they encroach upon the limited area of more impor-
tant interests...
.. .The portrayal of sex, e.g., in art, literature and scientific
works, is not itself sufficient reason to deny material the constitutional
protection of freedom of speech and press. Sex, a great and mysterious
motive force in human life, has indisputably been a subject of absorbing
interest to mankind through the ages; it is one of the vital problems of
human interest and public concern.' 51
The plurality in American Mini Theatres points to commercial speech
cases as indicating that some types of speech are entitled to less protection
148. Id. at 208-12.
149. Id. at 209-10.
150. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
151. Id. at 484, 487. And in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), the Court
said, "State statutes designed to regulate obscene materials must be carefully li-
mited. . . . As a result, we now confine the permissible scope of such regulation to
works which depict or describe sexual conduct. That conduct must be specifically defined
by the applicable state law, as written or authoritatively construed. A state offense must
also be limited to works which, taken as a whole, appeal to the prurient interest in sex,
which portray sexual conduct in a patently offensive way, and wxhich, taken as a whole,
do not have serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value.
"Under the holdings announced today, no one will be subject to prosecution for the
sale or exposure of obscene materials unless these materials depict or describe patently
offensive 'hard core' sexual conduct specifically defined by the regulating state law, as
written or construed." Id. at 23-24, 27.
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under the First Amendment. In Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights,"'2 the
Court upheld a municipal policy of refusing to sell advertising space on
transit vehicles to political advertisers. That the transit system was a com-
mercial venture implied that the vehicles were not a public forum and the
city was not required to grant everyone space. The travelers on transit
vehicles were also found to be a captive audience entitled to be protected
from the "blare" of political speech.153 The Court held in Bigelow v. Vir-
ginia... that speech involving sales or solicitation is not necessarily com-
mercial. The Court found the advertisement at issue to be fully protected by
the First Amendment, but indicated that all advertising might not be pro-
tected.1 55
In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer
Council, 56 the Court found that if pharmacists had a right to advertise,
consumers had a right to receive information about prescription drug prices.
The Court indicated that the consumer's interest in reception of information
might be as great as his interest in political speech."' The Court charac-
terized the speech in question as purely commercial and went on to hold that
it was entitled to First Amendment protection. 58 "Our question is whether
speech which does 'no more than propose a commercial transaction' . . . is
so removed from any 'exposition of ideas'. . . and from' "truth, science,
morality, and arts in general, in its diffusion of liberal sentiments on the
administration of Government," ' . . .that it lacks all protection."59
152. 418 U.S. 298 (1974).
153. Id. at 301-04.
154. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
155. Id. at 825. "We conclude, therefore, that the Virginia courts erred in their
assumptions that advertising, as such, was entitled to no First Amendment protection and
that appellant Bigelow had no legitimate First Amendment interest. We need not decide in
this case the precise extent to which the First Amendment permits regulation of advertis-
ing that is related to activities the State may legitimately regulate or even prohibit.
"Advertising, like all public expression, may be subject to reasonable regulation that
serves a legitimate public interest. . . .To the extent that commercial activity is subject
to regulation, the relationship of speech to that activity may be one factor, among others,
to be considered in weighing the First Amendment interest against the governmental inter-
est alleged. Advertising is not thereby stripped of all First Amendment protection." Id. at
825-26.
156. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
157. Id. at 763.
158. Id. at 770. "Here . ..the question whether there is a First Amendment ex-
ception for 'commercial speech' is squarely before us.
If there is a kind of commercial speech that lacks all First Amendment protection,
therefore, it must be distinguished by its content. Yet the speech whose content deprives
it of protection cannot simply be speech on a commercial subject.
What is at issue is whether a state may completely suppress the dissemination of
concededly truthful information about entirely lawful activity, fearful of that information's
effect upon its disseminators and its recipients. Reserving other questions, we conclude
that the answer to this one is in the negative." Id. at 760-61, 773.
159. Id. at 762.
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3. Application of First Amendment Doctrine
The plurality in American Mini Theatres concluded that in the past
certain types of speech have been regulated on the basis of content. In regard
to libel, the Court cited New York Times, Inc. v. Sullivan6 and Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc. 6 ' as examples of such regulation. Sullivan held that
non-malicious reporting of official speech is not libel, and therefore is
protected by the First Amendment. Gertz made it clear that defamation of
private persons is not protected by the First Amendment. Sullivan and Gertz,
however, determined that non-malicious reporting of official speech would
be fully protected on the basis of its public nature; no mention was made of
partial protection. Libelous speech was held unprotected, while other speech
was fully protected.
The plurality also alleged that non-obscene erotic material has been
regulated on the basis of content. It relied on Ginsberg v. New York. 6 as
support for this contention. Ginsberg held that speech that is protected for
viewing by adults may be deemed obscene if viewed by minors. 63 Ginsberg
does not allow regulation on the basis of content, however, but rather allows
total prohibition of certain types of speech for viewing by certain groups,
namely, minors.
A review of these cases indicates that none of them provides support for
the contention that protected speech may be regulated on the basis of its
content, other than by reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions. They
indicate, rather, that speech may be held to be totally unprotected on the
basis of content.
The Court in American Mini Theatres stated, in addition, that recent
cases have indicated that some forms of speech are entitled to less protec-
tion. The Court cited Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights164 as an example of
the partial protection of speech based on its commercial nature. In dicta, in
Bigelow v. Virginia,16" the Court indicated that commercial speech might be
afforded a degree of protection. In Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v.
Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,'66 however, the Court expressly held
that prescription drug prices, purely commercial speech, are entitled to the
full protection of the First Amendment. Thus, although the films inAmeri-
can Mini Theatres had a commercial aspect, in that they were shown for
profit, they should not have been denied the full protection of the First
Amendment under Virginia State Board of Pharmacy.
160. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
161. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
162. 390 U.S. 629 (1968).
163. Id. at 38-43.
164. 418 U.S. 298 (1976).
165. 421 U.S. 809 (1975).
166. 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
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In Lehman the Court reasoned that rapid transit vehicles were not
public forums. Due to the commercial nature of political advertising, the
city had no obligation to grant equal access to all advertisers. The speech
was still provided the full protection of the First Amendment, however.
Because political posters arguably could be more annoying to passengers
than commercial advertising, they could be banned from rapid transit vehi-
cles under a reasonable place restriction.
These cases illustrate that when the effects of certain types of speech on
the environment or on society differ from the effects of other types, the
offending speech may be subject to reasonable time, place, and manner
restrictions.' There is no support in the cases, however, for the Court's
conclusion that speech with a certain content is entitled to less protection
under the First Amendment.
168
The American Mini Theatres plurality then distinguished Erznoznik on
the grounds that in that case the city was attempting to regulate movies
solely on the basis of their offensive content, while in American Mini
Theatres the city was attempting to regulate only secondary effects of
speech.' 69 Justice Powell distinguished Erznoznik on the grounds that the
Jacksonville ordinances indiscriminately prohibited all nudity in a miscon-
ceived attempt to regulate the content of expression. Justice Powell charac-
terized the Detroit zoning ordinances as affecting expression only inciden-
tally and as accomplishing governmental ends unrelated to the regulation of
expression.'
In contrast to Justice Powell, Justice Stewart urged that Erznoznik was
directly analogous to American Mini Theatres because the ordinances in
neither case forbade distasteful expression, but instead required an alteration
in the location of the forum.'' In both cases the interest of the city was to
minimize the undesirable effects of speech having a certain content. Justice
Stewart concluded that constitutional freedom means that much unpleasant
speech will be protected.' 2
The ordinances in both Erznoznik and American Mini Theatres regulate
the location of businesses that desire to show films containing nudity. In
American Mini Theatres, the governmental interest in the preservation of
neighborhoods was greater than the interests of passers-by in Erznoznik not
to be confronted with nudity on giant picture screens. Detroit demonstrated
that allowing adult theaters to concentrate in certain areas causes property
167. See also, Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975); Lehman v.
City of Shaker Heights, 408 U.S. 298 (1974); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S.
104 (1972); Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536
(1965).
168. See text accompanying notes 142-59 supra.
169. 427 U.S. at 71 n.34.
170. Id. at 83-84 (Powell, J., concurring).
171. Id. at 88 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
172. Id.
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values to drop and the crime rate to rise. 7 3 Therefore, Erznoznik is not
directly analogous to American Mini Theatres. Erznoznik illustrates a time,
place, and manner restriction that was unreasonable because its content-
based distinction was not related to the expressed purpose of the statute,
traffic regulation. The Detroit ordinances in American Mini Theatres, how-
ever, were reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions because the
effect of the exhibition of adult films was different from that of non-adult
films and because the ordinances did not attempt directly to regulate speech
on the basis of its content. The American Mini Theatres holding that adult
films are entitled to less protection under the First Amendment was unneces-
sary to the decision; the issue could have been resolved as a legitimate time,
place, and manner restriction.'1 4 The Court, however, emphasized the rela-
tive value of various forms of expression.
Whether speech may be protected to a lesser degree on the basis of its
so-called value, as the plurality alleges, depends on what one considers the
purpose of the First Amendment. The First Amendment has been ap-
proached primarily from two points of view. Under the traditional theory, all
areas of expression except those few whose protection would circumvent an
overwhelming governmental interest are protected. Political, commercial,
artistic, and scientific speech are covered.'7 5 Under this theory, the purpose
of the Amendment is' to protect free discourse and exchange in all areas, and
all types of speech are equally protected.
Alexander Meiklejohn, a noted First Amendment scholar, theorized,
on the other hand, that only speech related to the people's power of self-
government is deserving of absolute protection. The First Amendment en-
compasses those powers the people have reserved to themselves; it does not
define a private right, but a public power.' 76 Included within the activities
absolutely protected are forms of expression and thought from which the
voter derives knowledge, intelligence, and sensitivity to human values.
Education, achievements in philosophy and the sciences, literature, and art,
and the dissemination of discussion of public issues are examples of ac-
tivities that the First Amendment would protect only as furthering the pub-
lic's ability to govern itself. 17  These activities, however, are not pursued
173. Appendix to Supreme Court Briefs at 1-39, Young v. American Mini
Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
174. See 427 U.S. at 78-79 (Powell, J., concurring in the judgment and portions of
the opinion).
175. See EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMEND-
MENT 3-8 (1966).
176. Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SuP. CT. L. REV.
254, 255. See also Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 626 n.3 (1976) (Brennan,
J., concurring).
177. Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an Absolute, 1961 SuP. CT. L. REv.
245, 256-57.
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to further the individual's own knowledge or self-fulfillment, but to further
the process of self-government.1
78
Meiklejohn's theory may have surfaced in several Supreme Court opin-
ions. New York Times, Inc. v. Sullivan19 has been noted as a case in which
the Court granted absolute protection to non-malicious reporting of official
speech of public officers. This new attitude' is exemplified by Garrison v.
Louisiana,' in which the Court stated that speech concerning public affairs
is the essence of self-government. 8 2 Garrison involved a statement by a
district attorney disparaging the conduct of certain judges. The Court held
that in a criminal case, as well as in the civil cases dealt with by New York
Times, only false statements concerning official conduct made with knowl-
edge of their falsity or with reckless disregard of their truth are punish-
able.' Although the Court may not have accepted Meiklejohn's theory
totally, there are indications that the plurality in American Mini Theatres
may have adopted his assumption that pure political speech is the core of
speech protected by the First Amendment, and the only type of speech
entitled to absolute protection. The Court may be extending this limited
concept of the First Amendment in American Mini Theatres by holding that
non-obscene, erotic films are entitled to less protection than other forms of
expression. Certainly statements to the effect that this form of speech has
little social value indicate this possibility."8
In the past, the protection of the First Amendment has not been limited
to great literature or to information central to the political process. This
would certainly imply that the government would not have the right to
suppress non-obscene material. Justice Stewart, in his dissent in American
Mini Theatres, argued that the full protection of the First Amendment has
never been held to be limited to expression we would fight to defend.
8
1
Non-obscene adult films are entitled to as much protection even though they
do not deal with what are considered "important" topics. In a related case
involving First Amendment regulation, Winters v. New York," 6 the Court
invalidated a statute that punished as a misdemeanor the sale, loan, or
178. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT
89, 100 (1948).
179. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
180. See Brennan, The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the
First Amendment, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1, 18-19 (1965). "The Court has emphasized that
the central meaning of the free expression guarantee is that the body politic of this Nation
shall be entitled to the communications necessary for self-governance .... "Time, Inc.
v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 471 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
181. 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
182. Id. at 74-75.
183. Id. at 74.
184. 427 U.S. at 61, 70.
185. Id. at 86.
186. 333 U.S. 507 (1948).
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distribution of any printed matter involving criminal news, police reports, or
accounts of criminal deeds, or pictures, or stories of deeds of bloodshed,
lust, or crime. The statute was aimed at the protection of minors. The Court
found the statute vague because it could cover protected conduct.' All
expression was to be protected equally regardless of social value:
We do not accede to appellee's suggestion that the constitutional protec-
tion for a free press applies only to the exposition of ideas. The line
between the informing and the entertaining is too elusive for the protec-
tion of that basic right. . . .What is one man's amusement, teaches
another's doctrine. Though we can see nothing of any possible value to
society in these magazines, they are as much entitled to the protection of
free speech as the best of literature.
1'88
The Court in American Mini Theatres uses two concepts on which to
base its holding; first, that speech may be regulated solely on the basis of its
content, and second, that adult films are entitled to less protection than other
forms of protected speech. Using these two doctrines, the Court concludes
that adult and non-adult theaters are not similarly situated under the Detroit
ordinances, and need not be similarly treated. Justice Powell believed that
not all types of theaters were affected by the Detroit ordinances: "The case
would present a different situation had Detroit brought within the ordinance
types of theaters that had not been shown to contribute to the deterioration of
surrounding areas."' 89 Even if non-adult and adult theaters are classified
differently, however, they are both affected by the ordinances. Because
non-adult theaters cannot show adult films without an adult license, all
theaters are regulated with respect to the showing of adult films. Both types
of theaters must meet the same criteria to show an adult film. The classifica-
tion is inaccurate because non-adult theaters, even though not covered by the
statute expressly, are impliedly covered when they show an adult film.
D. Zoning-Unresolved Issues
American Mini Theatres has broad implications for zoning law as well
as for First Amendment law. Traditionally, cities have enacted zoning ordi-
nances as a valid exercise of the police power, to serve the public health,
safety, morals, and general welfare.' ° Preservation of the character of
neighborhoods, the interest asserted in American Mini Theatres, has been
recognized in more recent decisions as a proper and even primary purpose of
187. Id. at 519-20.
188. Id. at 510.
189. 427 U.S. at 82 (Powell, J., concurring). See R. ANDERSON, AMERICAN
LAW OF ZONING § 7.03 (1977) [hereinafter cited as ANDERSON]. "The concept of pub-
lic welfare is broad and inclusive. . . .The values it represents are spiritual as well as
monetary. It is within the power of the legislature to determine that the community should
be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as well as clean .. " Berman v. Parker, 348
U.S. 26, 33 (1954).
190. ANDERSON, supra note 189, at § 7.03.
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zoning regulations.191 Originally, zoning ordinances relegated certain uses
to certain areas, and cities have traditionally concentrated certain uses into
limited areas.' 92 Cities such as Boston have attempted to zone adult bus-
inesses into one area, but the result has been an increase in crime, and a
deterioration of the area.' 93 Accordingly, some uses have been dispersed due
to their adverse effects on surrounding areas.' 94 Presumably the Court in
American Mini Theatres thought that dispersion of adult theaters was the
only acceptable method of dealing with adult businesses. Instead of ex-
pressly so stating, however, the Court substantially ignored the zoning is-
sues. 1
9 5
The Court has always accorded great deference to zoning ordi-
nances.' 96 They are presumed valid, and are evaluated under the most le-
nient rationality standards. 9 ' A recent example of such deference is Village
ofBelle Terre v. Boraas."'s The village had restricted land use in one area to
single-family dwellings, defining "family" as no more than two unrelated
persons.' 99 The owners of a house rented to six unrelated students were
served with an order to remedy the violation. Petitioners alleged, inter alia,
that the ordinance interfered with their right to travel, and with two other
fundamental rights, association and privacy.
The Court found that the ordinance was not designed to further any of
these purposes and that it did not abridge any fundamental right guaranteed
by the Constitution.2"' The Court intimated that it would use the "rational
relationship" test for the equal protection claim; active review was not
triggered, and the ordinance was upheld. JusticeMarshall dissented, recog-
nizing that the Belle Terre ordinance burdened the students' fundamental
191. Id. at § 7.27. Anderson cites Nortown Theatres, Inc. v. Gribbs, 373 F. Supp.
363 (E.D. Mich. 1974) and American Mini Theatres, Inc. v. Gribbs, 518 F.2d 1014 (6th
Cir. 1975), the lower court opinions, as examples of recent legislation that attempts to
regulate the location of adult bookstores as a moral objective. "These uses have been
found sufficiently different from the generality of commercial uses as to warrant their
separate classification in a zoning ordinance." ANDERSON, supra note 189, § 7.11. This
is not the expressed purpose of the Detroit ordinances, however. Affidavits supporting the
city's position indicate that moral issues may have been involved, but the expressed pur-
pose was that of preserving the quality of the neighborhoods. Appendix to Supreme Court
Briefs at 1-39, Young v. American Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
192. ANDERSON, supra note 189, at § 7.28.
193. NEWSWEEK, Dec. 6, 1976, at 35.
194. See ANDERSON, supra note 189, at § 7.28, describing ordinances requiring
gas stations to be a certain distance from one another, which were upheld.
195. See 427 U.S. at 71-73.
196. See, e.g., New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297 (1976); Berman v. Parker,
348 U.S. 26 (1954); City of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
197. ANDERSON, supra note 189, at § 3.14.
198. 416 U.S. 1 (1974).
199. Id. at 2.
200. Id. at 7-9.
Spring 1977] LEVELS OF PROTECTED SPEECH
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
rights of travel, association, and privacy that are protected by the First and
Fourteenth Amendments, and should therefore be subject to strict scru-
tiny."'1 Decisions such as Belle Terre indicate that the Court feels latitude
must be given to cities in promoting the health, safety, and general welfare
of their citizens. Local officials are best able to judge which means will
further these goals. 2 '
Modem comprehensive zoning ordinances may frequently conflict with
fundamental constitutional rights. °' For example, a zoning scheme in De-
catur, Illinois, which required that all buildings be set back from the street
and that adequate off-street parking be provided, was challenged by a church
as unconstitutional in Board of Zoning v. Decatur.2 °4 The state court found
that the setback requirement was reasonable, but that the parking space
requirement unduly burdened the right to freedom of worship because it
would have prevented the erection of the church altogether. As the Court
noted:
When. . . the welfare and safety of the people in the neighborhood is
placed in the scales of justice on one side, and the right to freedom of
worship and assembly is placed on the other, the balance weighs heavily
on the side guaranteeing the right to peaceful assembly and to worship
God according to the dictate of conscience, regardless of ffith or
creed.205
Similarly, in Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville,2°6 speech protected by the
First Amendment was regulated on the basis of its unsavory content.20 7 The
Court overturned the ordinance, finding the proffered governmental interests
inadequate to sustain such a regulation of protected speech.
There is no reason why a zoning ordinance should be given more
weight than any other legislation that potentially conflicts with constitutional
rights.
It is inconceivable to me that we would allow the exercise of the
zoning power to burden First Amendment freedoms, as by ordinances
201. Id. at 12-20.
202. See Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development
Corp., 97 S. Ct. 555 (1977), which applied a rationality standard to a village's refusal to
rezone land to allow construction of low-income housing. The Court referred to the
"generous Euclid test," allowing any zoning scheme not irrational or arbitrary to stand.
See also Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
203. See Frame & Scorza, Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas: Property Rights, Per-
sonal Rights and the Liberal Regime, 2 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 935 (1975).
204. 117 N.E.2d 115 (1954).
205. Id. at 120.
206. 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
207. See text accompanying notes 169-75 supra.
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that restrict occupancy to individuals adhering to particular religious,
political or scientific beliefs. Zoning officials properly concern them-
selves with the uses of land-with, for example, the number and kind of
dwellings to be constructed in a certain neighborhood or the number of
persons who can reside in those dwellings. But zoning authorities cannot
validly consider who those persons are, what they believe, or how they
choose to live, whether they are Negro or white, Catholic or Jew, Repub-
lican or Democrat, married or unmarried."'
The Court in American Mini Theatres, in its desire to uphold the
Detroit ordinances, minimized the fundamental right involved. The Court
concluded that adult films are entitled to less protection than other forms of
protected speech.20 9 Under the Court's holding, less protected speech would
not be deemed fundamental. Justice Powell, although he did not join in this
section of the opinion, found the Detroit ordinances valid because they
infringed only indirectly on First Amendment rights.210 The plurality section
dealing with the equal protection claim could be read to allow infringement
of less protected speech only when the effect on such speech is indirect.2 '
Alternatively, the opinion could be read broadly to authorize a city's use of
the zoning power to regulate forms of protected speech whenever officials
decide that a type of speech is entitled to less protection. The latter interpre-
tation constitutes a substantial retreat from traditional First Amendment
guarantees.
Conclusion
In the past, the First Amendment has been interpreted to mean that
some speech is fully protected. Other types of speech such as libel, obscen-
ity, fighting words, and words that incite to crime received no protection.
The Court in American Mini Theatres broke new ground by holding that
non-obscene, sex-oriented films are entitled to less protection under the First
Amendment than other types of speech. The Court denied the theaters stand-
ing to challenge the Detroit ordinances on the ground of vagueness, men-
tioning the limited social value of adult films. It concluded that as only the
location of theaters was regulated, the effect on First Amendment expression
was slight. The Court also rejected a prior restraint challenge. Because
theaters could locate anywhere in the city provided they obtained a license,
208. Village of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 14-15 (Marshall, J., dissent-
ing).
209. 427 U.S. at 70-71.
210. Id. at 79-82 (Powell, J., concurring).
211. See the discussion of United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), supra
note 30.
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and because the interest in preserving neighborhoods was strong, no prior
restraint was imposed. Last, the Court rejected an equal protection chal-
lenge. Adult and non-adult theaters were found not to be similarly situated
with respect to the purpose of the ordinance because of the lesser value of
adult films and their different impact on neighborhoods and therefore did not
have to be similarly treated. Instead of upholding the Detroit ordinances as a
reasonable time, place, and manner regulation, the Court went further to
hold that non-obscene, sex-oriented films were entitled to only partial pro-
tection under the First Amendment.
The recurring theme of the majority opinion was the limited value of
adult films in comparison with expression such as that involving political
topics. As Justice Blackmun stated in his dissent: "As to the third reason,
that 'adult' material is simply entitled to less protection, it certainly explains
the lapse in applying settled vagueness principles, as indeed it explains this
whole case.""'2 Another factor that may have been important in the Court's
decision is the fact that a zoning ordinance was involved. Zoning ordinances
are treated with great deference because zoning is one of the principal means
by which cities can deal with complex and confusing urban problems. The
Court may have decided to leave the resolution of these problems to the
municipalities. The fact that constitutional rights were involved, however,
should have called for closer scrutiny of the zoning ordinance.
The Court's holding that adult, non-obscene films deserve less protec-
tion implies that such expression does not involve a fundamental right.
Regulation of adult films, therefore, deserves only minimal scrutiny. This
radical break with prior First Amendment law sets a precedent by which
courts will be able to pick and choose among forms of speech, establishing
levels of First Amendment protection. This is an objectionable interpretation
of tie First Amendment because it allows the courts to determine the value
of different forms of speech. These value decisions should be left to each
citizen to make for himself. Each person has the right to communicate and
receive expressions concerning ideas, feelings, and reflections. This free-
dom should not be limited to speech that relates to government or politics.
Political expression is certainly necessary to the maintenance of a democra-
tic society, but the First Amendment should protect expression on any topic.
There are a few limited exceptions essential to the smooth functioning of a
civilized society, such as libel and "fighting words," but the greater part of
speech should receive the full protection of the First Amendment.
212. 427 U.S. at 96.
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A hierarchy of protected speech undercuts the basic right to receive and
communicate on any topic. If such a hierarchy were instituted on the basis of
American Mini Theatres, the judiciary would have the privilege of placing
every type of speech somewhere on the scale, thereby defining the scope of
a person's right to communicate and to express himself. The vagueness and
confusion resulting from such a determination would culminate in a virtual
re-writing of the First Amendment, and a new, more limited guarantee.

